2015 Decisions

Opinions of the United
States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

10-19-2015

Shemtov Michtavi v. William Scism

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015

Recommended Citation
"Shemtov Michtavi v. William Scism" (2015). 2015 Decisions. 1110.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015/1110

This October is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in 2015 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Digital Repository.

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 14-4104
_____________
SHEMTOV MICHTAVI
v.
WILLIAM SCISM, FORMER WARDEN, LSCI ALLENWOOD;
J. MILLER, SUPERVISING PHYSICIAN, LSCI ALLENWOOD;
D. SPOTTS, COORDINATOR, HEALTH SERVICES, LSCI ALLENWOOD;
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; J.L. NORWOOD, NORTHEAST REGIONAL
DIRECTOR;HARRELL WATTS, NATIONAL INMATE ADMINISTRATIVE
APPEALS ADMINISTRATOR; DELBERT G. SAUERS, WARDEN LSCI
ALLENWOOD; FRANK STRADA, FORMER WARDEN, LSCI ALLENWOOD;
DOES #1 TO #5
William Scism,
D. Spotts,
J. Miller,
Appellants

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(District Court No.: 1-12-cv-01196)
District Judge: Honorable John E Jones, III

Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
on September 11, 2015

(Opinion filed: October 19, 2015)

Before: VANASKIE, SLOVITER, RENDELL Circuit Judges
O P I N I O N

RENDELL, Circuit Judge
Shemtov Michtavi, a pro se prisoner, brought suit against William Scism, former
warden of the Federal Correctional Institution in Allenwood, D. Spotts, former Assistant
Health Services Administrator and medical supervisor at Allenwood, and Dr. J. Miller,
supervising physician at Allenwood (“Appellants”), for their failure to treat his retrograde
ejaculation condition. Appellants moved for summary judgment based on qualified
immunity, but the District Court denied their motion because it concluded that there was
a question as to whether retrograde ejaculation is a serious medical need requiring
treatment under the Eighth Amendment. Appellants appeal that order, and we conclude
that they are entitled to qualified immunity because a prisoner’s right to treatment of
retrograde ejaculation, infertility, or erectile dysfunction is not clearly established.
Accordingly, we will reverse the District Court’s order and remand for the District Court
to enter summary judgment in Appellants’ favor.



This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

2

I.

Background
While he was incarcerated at Allenwood, Michtavi received an operation to treat

his prostate. The Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) contracted with Dr. Chopra, who
was not a BOP employee, to perform the surgery. After the surgery, Michtavi noticed
that the quantity of his ejaculate had reduced. He was diagnosed with retrograde
ejaculation. He asked the BOP to treat this problem “because when I do finally get
released from prison, I wish to have a normal sex life.” (J.A. 163.) He also complained
that if he was not treated, he might become impotent. The BOP responded that it does
not treat impotence. On January 13, 2011, Michtavi saw Dr. Chopra, who “advised that
Psuedofel would be prescribed to close the hole that was opened during the laser surgery
which would thereby prevent ejaculate from leaking into the bladder.” (J.A. 267.)
The BOP did not provide the medication because “[i]t is the Bureau of Prison’s
position that the treatment of a sexual dysfunction is not medically necessary,
and . . . medical providers are not to talk to inmates about ejaculation, since it is a
prohibited sexual act.” (J.A. 188.)1
Michtavi filed suit, asserting an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate
indifference to his serious medical need. Appellants filed a motion to dismiss and for
summary judgment and argued that they were entitled to qualified immunity. The
Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation, recommending that their motion
be denied because “the right to procreation is a fundamental right and the Supreme Court

1

BOP regulations prohibit “[e]ngaging in sexual acts.” 28 C.F.R. § 541.3, tbl.1 no. 205.
3

has recognized that a prisoner has a fundamental right to post-incarceration procreation.”
(J.A. 93.) The Magistrate Judge cited Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S.
535, 541 (1942), in which the Supreme Court struck down a law mandating sterilization
for habitual criminals. The Magistrate Judge then concluded that “prisoners retain a
fundamental right to preserve their procreative abilities for use following release from
custody.” (J.A. 93.) She recommended that, because Michtavi had alleged that
retrograde ejaculation could make him sterile, his Eighth Amendment claims should
survive summary judgment. She also concluded that the Defendants were not entitled to
qualified immunity because Eighth Amendment jurisprudence clearly establishes that
prison officials may not be indifferent to a serious medical need. The District Court
adopted the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation. Appellants then filed this
interlocutory appeal challenging the District Court’s denial of qualified immunity.
II.

Analysis2
Appellants are entitled to qualified immunity. “Qualified immunity shields federal

and state officials from money damages unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that
the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly
established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074,
2080 (2011) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).

We have jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal because “a district court’s denial of a
claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of law, is an appealable
‘final decision’ within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 notwithstanding the absence of a
final judgment.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985).
2
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The District Court defined the right at issue as either the Eighth Amendment right
to treatment of serious medical needs or the fundamental right to procreate, but both of
those definitions are too broad. Courts must define the right at issue with specificity: “In
determining whether a right has been clearly established, the court must define the right
allegedly violated at the appropriate level of specificity.” Sharp v. Johnson, 669 F.3d
144, 159 (3d Cir. 2012); see also al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2084 (“We have repeatedly told
courts . . . not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality. The general
proposition, for example, that an unreasonable search or seizure violates the Fourth
Amendment is of little help in determining whether the violative nature of particular
conduct is clearly established.”) (citations omitted). A properly tailored definition of the
right at issue here is whether the BOP is obligated to treat retrograde ejaculation,
infertility, or erectile dysfunction.
In Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2044 (2015) (per curiam), the Supreme Court
held that there was no clearly established right to suicide prevention measures in prisons
and emphasized the importance of the “clearly established” prong of qualified immunity.
The Supreme Court explained that, “[n]o decision of this Court establishes a right to the
proper implementation of adequate suicide prevention protocols. No decision of this
Court even discusses suicide screening or prevention protocols.” Id. at 2044. It also
noted that, “‘to the extent that a robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority’ in the
Courts of Appeals ‘could itself clearly establish the federal right respondent alleges,’ the
weight of that authority at the time of Barkes’s death suggested that such a right did not
exist.” Id. at 2044 (quoting City & Cnty. of S.F., Cal. v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1778
5

(2015)). Thus, Barkes makes clear that there must be precedent indicating that the right
at issue is clearly established.
There is no Supreme Court or appellate precedent holding that prison officials
must treat retrograde ejaculation, infertility, or erectile dysfunction; in fact, the weight of
authority is to the contrary. The Magistrate Judge relied on Skinner, but Skinner
establishes only that states may not sterilize prisoners; it does not hold that prisoners are
entitled to treatment for infertility or sexual problems. The Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit has held that a prisoner is not entitled to treatment for erectile dysfunction.
It upheld a district court’s grant of summary judgment to prison officials who failed to
treat an inmate’s erectile dysfunction because “erectile dysfunction cannot be said to be a
serious medical condition, given that no physician indicated its treatment was mandatory,
it was not causing . . . pain, and it was not life-threatening.” Lyons v. Brandly, 430 F.
App’x 377, 381 (6th Cir. 2011). And, in Goodwin v. Turner, 908 F.2d 1395 (8th Cir.
1990), the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld the BOP’s policy against
permitting prisoners to procreate. The BOP had denied a prisoner’s request for “a clean
container in which to deposit his ejaculate, and a means of swiftly transporting the
ejaculate outside the prison” to his wife, who could inject herself with a syringe. Id. at
1398. The Goodwin court held that, even though procreation is a fundamental right, “the
restriction imposed by the Bureau is reasonably related to achieving its legitimate
penological interest.” Id. While Goodwin did not involve a medical condition, it did
hold that the BOP is not required to help a prisoner procreate. Because there is no
authority establishing—let alone “clearly” establishing—a right for prisoners to receive
6

treatment for retrograde ejaculation, infertility, or erectile dysfunction, Appellants are
entitled to qualified immunity.
Accordingly, we will reverse and remand to the District Court with instructions to
enter summary judgment for Appellants.
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